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The study aims to find out whether the disappearing dividends, the decline in the number
of dividend payers, the size effect and the increasing dividend/earnings concentration found
in several developed and emerging markets exist among the industrials traded in the ISE. The
study also analyzes the effects of the reinstatement of mandatory dividend policy in 2003.
Using univariate statistical tests, we detect a size effect as well as a high level but stable divi-
dend/earnings concentration. We find a significant decrease in the number of dividend payers,
but we also detect an increasing level of real/nominal dividends driven by the high divi-
dend/earnings concentration and the increasing level of earnings. The reinstatement of the
mandatory dividend policy regulation in 2003 has not been successful in changing the payout
policy of industrials.  
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Temettü politikas› ile ilgili birçok çal›ﬂmada,  geliﬂmiﬂ ve geliﬂen piyasalarda temettü yok olu-
ﬂu, temettü ödeyen halka aç›k ﬂirket say›s›nda azal›ﬂ, ﬂirket büyüklü¤ü etkisi ve gittikçe artan ka-
zanç ve temettü yo¤unlaﬂmas› tespit edilmiﬂtir. Bu çal›ﬂmada, söz konusu tespitlerin ‹MKB’nda
iﬂlem gören sanayi ﬂirketleri için de geçerli olup olmad›¤› araﬂt›r›lm›ﬂt›r. Tek de¤iﬂkenli istatistik
testleri kullan›larak, ﬂirket büyüklü¤ü etkisi ve yüksek fakat istikrarl› bir temettü ve kazanç yo¤un-
lu¤u bulunmuﬂtur. Ayr›ca, temettü ödeyen ﬂirketler say›s›nda önemli bir azal›ﬂ oldu¤u gözlenmiﬂ-
tir. Ancak, bu azal›ﬂa ra¤men, yüksek kazanç ve temettü yo¤unlu¤u sonucunda, yükselen ka-
zançlarla birlikte 2003 mali y›l›ndan itibaren nominal ve reel toplam temettü seviyesinde önemli
bir yükseliﬂ saptanm›ﬂt›r. 2003 mali y›l› itibar› ile tekrar yürürlü¤e konulan zorunlu temettü da¤›-
t›m politikas› ﬂirketlerin temettü politikalar›nda herhangi bir de¤iﬂiklik yaratmam›ﬂt›r.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Temettü, Temettü Politikas›, Temettü Yok Oluﬂu, Temettü Çeﬂitleri, Yo¤unluk,
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1. Introduction
Fama and French have lead to a series of studies with their article published in
2001 “Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity
to Pay?” showing a significant decrease in the number and percent of manufactur-
ing and commercial corporations (thereafter, industrials) that pay dividends in the
U.S. over the period between 1978 and 1998. Fama and French focus on determin-
ing the characteristics of dividend payers and the changes in these characteristics
affecting the decision to pay dividends, namely profitability, investment opportuni-
ties and size. They put forward that there had been an increase in the number of
publicly traded firms having the characteristics of non-payers (i.e., low earnings,
strong investments and small size) and there had been a reduced propensity to pay
dividends by firms having the characteristics of a typical dividend payer. 
In response to Fama and French’s article on disappearing dividends, DeAngelo et
al. (2004) revisit the evidence and point out that the dividends are not disappearing
in the U.S. but both nominal and real amount of dividends increase over time
accompanied by a large decrease in the number of firms that pay small dividends
and an increasing level dividend/earnings concentration among the biggest payers.
In European Union Countries (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008) and in Canada, U.K.,
Germany, France, and Japan (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Ferris et al., 2006a, 2006b
and 2008), similar findings such as the high concentration of dividend payments by
a few industrials with high earnings, the declining propensity to pay, the close con-
nection between the dividend payment decision and the profitability, size, invest-
ment opportunities, and earned/contributed capital mix are found. 
Few studies have been done investigating the disappearing dividends and divi-
dend/earnings concentration phenomenon in emerging markets. In this study, we
aim to find out whether the increasing dividend/earnings concentration, the decline
in the number of dividend payers, and the size effect found in developed markets
also exist among the industrials trading in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The div-
idend policy regulatory environment in Turkey enriches the study due to the fact
that during 1986-2007 dividend distribution years, industrials traded in the ISE have
been legally subject to mandatory and flexible dividend payout policies. Typically,
mandatory dividend policies are not used in developed markets. Focusing on the
regulatory environment between 1982 and 2003, a few studies (Adaoglu, 1999 and
2000; Yilmaz, 2003; Yilmaz and Gulay, 2006) have been carried out investigating
the dividend payout policy of corporations trading in ISE. This study revisits the
empirical observations of these studies and extends them covering the latest regu-
latory setting that legally obliges the corporations trading in the ISE to pay a certain
level of their distributable profit as cash dividends and/or stock dividends starting
with 2003 fiscal year. We also try to see whether there has been a change in the
choice of payout tools such as the use of stock dividends.115
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Since the abolishment of mandatory dividend policy regulation in 1994 fiscal year,
we observe a substantial decrease in the number of dividend payers among ISE indus-
trials followed by an insufficient increase in the number of dividend payers as a result
of the reinstatement of mandatory dividend policy in 2003. The reinstatement of the
mandatory dividend policy has not been successful due to the fact there is no strong
change in the number of cash dividend payers which has only caught the level of pay-
ers in 1999 during the flexible dividend policy period. Using dividend payout policy
ratios at the market and corporate level, we observe a significantly increasing level of
real dividend payments starting with 2003 fiscal year. This is mainly due to the fact that
there is a high level of dividend/earnings concentration among the ISE industrials driv-
ing the level of dividends upwards by dividend paying industrials having more earnings
during the uninterrupted economic growth period between 2003 and 2006 fiscal
years. Finally, stock dividends have not emerged as a substitute payout tool in place of
cash dividends, but dividend omissions have become the only tool of payout policy in
case of having losses in the income statement.
In the following section, we have a brief literature review followed by the investiga-
tion of regulatory environment for the dividend policy in Section 3. We present the data
and methodology in Section 4 and the empirical results can be found in Section 5.
Finally, we present the conclusions complemented by further research implications.
2. Literature Review
Fama and French (2001) pioneered the debate regarding the disappearing divi-
dends with their finding that there is a substantial decrease in the number of cash
dividend payers from the high level of 66.5% in 1978 to a level of 20.8% in 1999.
The underlying reason is the increasing number and entry of publicly traded indus-
trials having the characteristics of non-dividend payers – small size, low earnings and
good investment opportunities. In addition to the change in firm characteristics,
they also find a lower propensity to pay dividends among the U.S. industrials.
DeAngelo et al. (2004) join the debate with their finding that dividends are not dis-
appearing. They find an upward trend in the level of real and nominal dividends
paid, and the increasing dividend and earnings concentration has contributed to this
increase with few firms having high earnings.
In fifteen nations of the European Union, Von Eije and Megginson (2007) detect
a similar decrease in the percentage number of European firms paying dividends
from 92% to 62% between 1989 and 2003. However, the total real dividends and
dividend payments as a fraction of corporate profits increase significantly together
with a sharp increase in dividend and earnings concentration. They also detect sim-
ilar firm characteristics as in the U.S. resulting in the declining propensity to pay.
Ferris et al. (2006a) repeat the study for the U.K. firms and find the same significant
decline in the percentage of dividend payers from 75.9% to 54.5% between 1988116 Cahit Adao¤lu
and 2002. Ferris et al. (2006b) extend their study to Japan followed by another
study (Ferris et al., 2008) covering an international data set of 30 countries. They
find high dividend and earnings concentration, but also detect a substantial varia-
tion in the propensity to pay dividends. Denis and Osobov (2008) study U.S.,
Canada, U.K., Germany, France, and Japan, and in each country, they find that
aggregate dividends have not decreased and are concentrated among the largest
and most profitable firms, and among firms having retained earnings making up a
significant fraction of total equity.
Reddy and Rath (2005) investigate the issue of disappearing dividends for the
Indian emerging market and find similar findings in the dividend behavior of Indian
industrials. They detect a decline in the percentage of dividend payers between
1991 and 2001, and a reduced propensity to pay dividends. They also find that the
dividend paying industrials are larger and more profitable than non-paying industri-
als, but could not detect a significant effect of investment opportunities. Ronapat
(2003) investigates the disappearing dividends phenomenon between 1990 and
2002 for the Thai listed firms and finds similar results. Two studies by Aivazian et al.
(2003a and 2003b) with a broad data set of emerging markets including Turkey find
that dividends are explained by profitability, debt, and the market-to-book ratio
(investment opportunities proxy), and emerging market industrials typically follow
unstable dividend policies reducing the role of dividend policy as a signaling device.
3. The Regulatory Framework
The regulatory discussion focuses on the fact that during 1982-2007, public corpo-
rations were subject to three different set of regulatory policies which were put into ef-
fect by the Capital Markets Board (CMB), the supervisory body in Turkey. With the
enactment of Capital Markets Board Law in 1982, public corporations had to distribu-
te at least half of their distributable profit as cash dividends. At that time, since there
was no organized exchange, shareholders faced an illiquid capital market for their
stocks and the only source of income was the dividend income (Adaoglu, 2000). This
mandatory cash dividend regulatory policy had been in effect till the end of 1994 (1993
fiscal year) and meanwhile, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was opened in 1986 as
the official organized stock market. 
Starting with fiscal year 1994, the Capital Markets Board implemented a significant
change in the regulatory environment1 abolishing the mandatory cash dividend distributi-
on requirement only for the public corporations which were traded in the ISE. Since the
shareholders of these traded corporations had the ability to incorporate their analysis of
the dividend policy in the stock price by their buy and sell strategies, the CMB granted full
flexibility in determining the dividend policy which was subject to voting in the annual ge-
(1) Decree issued by CMB Serial: IV, No.9 published in the Official Gazette dated 27/12/1994 and No: 22154.117
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neral meeting. In addition to the abolishment of mandatory dividend policy, stock divi-
dends were introduced for the first time as another payout policy tool. Consequently, pub-
lic corporations which were traded in the ISE could distribute cash dividends only, stock di-
vidends only, both stock and cash dividends together and no dividends at all.
Adaoglu (1999, 2000), Yilmaz (2003), Yilmaz and Gulay (2006) show that following
the changes in the regulatory environment, there is a substantial decrease in the ave-
rage cash dividend payout ratios and a substantial increase in the number of non-pa-
yers. In 2001, Turkey had gone through a major economic crisis resulting in substanti-
al losses for shareholders, especially small Turkish investors who heavily invested in the
Turkish stocks prior to the economic crisis.  Facing a major economic crisis, Turkey sig-
ned a standby agreement with IMF and started to implement major structural reforms.
The stock market bounced back and attracted a substantial amount of foreign invest-
ment. However, the dismay of small Turkish investors had continued and in order to at-
tract the Turkish investors back to the stock market, the Capital Markets Board reinsta-
ted the mandatory dividend policy2 starting with fiscal year 2003 in line with the po-
wer granted to CMB in determining the mandatory dividend level by the change in Ar-
ticle 15 of Capital Markets Board Law dated 15/12/1999 and No: 4487 (published in
Official Gazette dated 18/12/1999 No: 23910).
With the reinstatement of mandatory dividend policy, public corporations which we-
re traded in the ISE had to pay at least 20% of their distributable income in cash divi-
dends or in stock dividends or a combination of both, but the total distribution of cash
dividends and/or stock dividends could not be less than 20% of the distributable profit
for fiscal year 2003. In contrast to the mandatory cash dividend policy requirement bet-
ween 1982 and1994, public corporations do not have to pay in cash but have the op-
tion of distributing stock dividends with the requirement that the amount of stock di-
vidends is added to the paid-in capital. Starting with fiscal year 2003, on a yearly basis,
the CMB informed the public corporations of its decision regarding the minimum per-
centage of the distributable income that had to be paid to shareholders. For 2004 fis-
cal year, the minimum percentage was increased from 20% to 30% which stayed at
this level for fiscal year 2005 as well. For fiscal year 2006, the level was decreased to
20% and stayed at this level for 2007.3
(2) Capital Markets Board decision number 16535 published in the Capital Markets Board Weekly
Announcement Bulletin No. 2003/63 dated 30/12/2003.
(3) For fiscal year 2004, Capital Markets Board decision number 51/1747 dated 30/12/2004 published
in the Capital Markets Board Weekly Announcement Bulletin No. 2004/54.
For fiscal year 2005, Capital Markets Board decision number 4/67 dated 27/01/2006 published in
the Capital Markets Board Weekly Announcement Bulletin No. 2006/3.
For fiscal year 2006, Capital Markets Board decision number 2/53 dated 18/01/2007 published in
the Capital Markets Board Weekly Announcement Bulletin No. 2007/3. 
For fiscal year 2007, Capital Markets Board decision number 4/138 dated 8/01/2008 published in
the Capital Markets Board Weekly Announcement Bulletin No. 2008/6.118 Cahit Adao¤lu
Till the end of 2001, public corporations could only distribute dividends annually and
they were required to complete the dividend payments within five months following
the end of fiscal year. At the end of 2001 (CMB decree dated 13/11/2001, Serial: IV,
No. 27), public corporations are allowed to distribute interim dividends, as called advan-
ce dividend payments in Turkey, on a quarterly basis during the fiscal year. However,
due to tight restrictions, unclear taxation policy and heavy bureaucracy in the distribu-
tion of interim dividends, and the tendency of keeping the earnings for internal finan-
cing, interim dividend payments have not been popular among the public corporations. 
4. Data and Methodology
The data is obtained from the ISE official website links for the “ISE Companies
Capital Increases and Dividend Payments 1986-2007/06” and “Dividend Payments
and Footnotes 2007”.4 Financial institutions and utilities5 are excluded from the
population since corporations in these two industries have different investment and
dividend payout policies relative to industrial and commercial corporations. These
two electronic sources and the Rasyonet Hisse XL 2.3.2 software program provide
the data for earnings, cash and stock dividend amounts, and market capitalization.
Parametric and non-parametric univariate statistical tests, namely t-test, Mann-
Whitney test, ANOVA F-test and Kruskal-Wallis H-test are used to test for differences
in means/medians between two samples and among subgroups. Where needed,
Pearson correlation test is also used in the study.
Two measures of dividend payout ratio is used, namely the traditional dividend pay-
out ratio at the “corporate level” and the aggregate dividend payout ratio at the “mar-
ket level”. The traditional dividend payout ratio is the ratio of total gross dividends to
total published profits of the corporation. A better measure of the denominator in the
cash dividend payout ratio is the “distributable profit” relative to the published
profits/losses. Corporations pay out cash dividends out of the distributable profit which
is calculated by subtracting all taxes, previous years’ losses (including the inflation
adjustment losses) and the first legal reserve from the profit before tax. However, the
“distributable profit” figures are not electronically available leading to the use of pub-
lished profits as the best proxy. However, the effects of these factors on the distrib-
utable profit, especially the previous years’ losses and inflation adjustment losses, are
(4) The ISE official website links for “ISE Companies Capital Increases and Dividend Payments 1986-
2007/06” and “Dividend Payments and Footnotes” are http://www.imkb.gov.tr/sirket/
sermaye_temettu.htm and http://www.imkb.gov.tr/veri/temettu2007.zip respectively. It should
be noted that the dividend payments of 1986-2007 period pertain to the fiscal years of ISE corpo-
rations from 1985 to 2006.
(5) As classified by the ISE, financial institutions are banks and special finance corporations, insurance
companies, financial leasing and factoring companies, holding and investment companies, broker-
age houses, real estate investment trusts, and investment trusts and utility companies are electric-
ity, gas and steam.119
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analyzed by following the amount of losses of the corporations over the analysis peri-
od. The effects of economic crisis years and the effects of  the changes in the financial
reporting standards are also analyzed in the study. Additionally, gross dividends are
used for all fiscal years since it shows the total amount of dividend payments to both
shareholders and the tax authorities, and it enables us to use a uniform dividend defi-
nition throughout the analysis period of 1986-2007.
Corporations can pay out cash dividends even though they have losses, especial-
ly by using the retained earnings. The negative net income figure creates a problem
as the traditional dividend payout ratio which has a lower limit of zero (no divi-
dends) turns out to be negative at the corporate level. In order to avoid this prob-
lem and to observe the general trend in the market, the aggregate dividend payout
ratio is used defined as the sum of the total gross dividends across all cash dividend
paying corporations divided by the sum of all published profits/losses (net earnings)
across all these corporations (Da Silva et al., 2004). In addition to the aggregate pay-
out ratio, another market level payout ratio, namely the profits payout ratio, is cal-
culated by dividing the total amount of cash dividends by the total amount of prof-
its of all industrial corporations. This measure is used to analyze the dividend behav-
ior especially during the mandatory cash dividend payout years in which corpora-
tions having profit had to pay out a certain amount of cash dividends.
Adaoglu (1999), Yilmaz (2003), and Yilmaz and Guzhan (2006) use another
measure of dividend payout ratio called net dividend payout ratio calculated by sub-
tracting the amount of rights issues from cash dividends and dividing the result by
the amount of profits. We do not use this measure in this study since there are other
corporate motivations behind the use of rights issues such as obtaining funds for
investment opportunities and/or increasing the amount of eroding paid-in capital in
an inflationary environment. 
5. Empirical Evidence
5.1. Aggregate earnings/dividend levels and payouts
We begin our analysis by studying the earnings and dividend behavior of the ISE
industrial corporations by examining the aggregate levels which are deflated to May
1986 price levels using the May to May6 yearly changes in the CPI index. Figure 1
tracks the deflated aggregate cash dividends, aggregate stock dividends, aggrega-
te positive earnings (profits), net earnings (profits-losses) of cash dividend payers,
and aggregate losses over the 1985-2006 fiscal years (1986-2007 distribution ye-
ars). There is a cyclical variation in the cash dividend levels closely following the
(6) May is taken as the base month since legally, corporations are required to complete the payment
of cash dividends by the end of this month and typically, ISE corporations complete the dividend
payments by the end of this month.cycles in the aggregate positive earnings as well as the cycles in the net earnings of
cash dividend payers. Typically, in developed capital markets, corporations smooth
out the dividends resulting in a smooth trend in the dividend level even though ear-
nings have cyclicality. 
In Figure 1, we do not observe any significant change in the amount of aggregate
cash dividends between 1985-2002 fiscal years even though the number of industrial
corporations traded in the ISE increased from 32 to 215. For the period 2003-2006 with
no significant change in the number of traded industrial corporations (see Table 1 for
the changes in the number of corporations traded), we observe a significant increase
in aggregate cash dividend levels followed by significant increases in both aggregate
positive earnings and net earnings of cash dividend payers. It should be noted that du-
ring the 2002-2006 period, major reforms under the supervision of IMF had been imp-
lemented with an uninterrupted growth in the economy and a significant increase in
foreign direct/indirect investments.  The close levels of aggregate positive earnings and
net earnings of cash dividend payers indicate that cash dividend payers make up a high
percentage of industrial earnings in all years. 
Additionally, we observe that the economic crisis in 1994 does not alter the
trends due to the fact that ISE corporations earned profits not from their operating
activities but from their cash investments in t-bills paying a significantly high real ra-
te of return. However, the effect of 2001 economic crisis is clearly observed in Figu-
re 1 with significant decreases in aggregate cash dividends and earnings accompa-
nied by a substantial increase in aggregate losses. Even though both aggregate po-
sitive earnings (profits) and net earnings of cash dividend payers increase in 2002
fiscal year, there is no noticeable change in the level of cash dividends in this year
mainly due to the accumulated losses of 2001 economic crisis in the financial state-
ments lowering the amount of distributable profit. In 2003 fiscal year, we also ob-
serve a significant increase in aggregate losses accompanied by a significant increa-
se in aggregate positive earnings and a slight increase in aggregate cash dividends.
This can be explained by the fact that starting with 2003 fiscal year, ISE corporati-
ons adopted the inflation adjusted financial reporting standards resulting in down-
ward earnings adjustments and at the same time, they were subject to 20% man-
datory dividend payout ratio.7 Looking at the aggregate stock dividends starting in
1994 fiscal year, we see no significant change in the aggregate stock dividend le-
vels between 1994 and 2006 even though the number of traded industrial corpora-
tions increases from 140 to 224 during that period.
120 Cahit Adao¤lu
(7) Topaç (2004) states that for 101 corporations using both unadjusted and inflation adjusted finan-
cial reporting standards in 2003 fiscal year, only 57 of 101 corporations report profits in both unad-
justed and adjusted income statements. He also finds that total profits in unadjusted income state-
ments add up to 181 trillion TL where as this figure turns out to be 118 trillion loss in inflation
adjusted income statements.121
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Table 1 (Panel A) shows the profits payout ratio at the market level together with
the mandatory dividend payout ratio for each fiscal year. Panel B shows the profits
payout ratio for selected periods which are determined taking into account the reg-
ulatory changes, the economic crisis in 2001 and the changes in financial reporting
standards. The 1986-1989 period (1985-88 fiscal years) is the early growth period
of the stock exchange with the opening of the market to foreign investors in late
1989. The 1990-1994 period (1989-1993 fiscal years) is characterized as the fast
growth period in terms of trading volume, market volume and the number of trad-
ed corporations. The 1995-2003 period (1994-2002 fiscal years) is characterized by
the abolition of mandatory cash dividend payment of 50% and the implementation
of full flexibility in determining the payout policy and the use of stock dividends as
another tool of payout policy. The 2001 economic crisis is another important eco-
nomic and financial event during this period. During the 2004-2007 period (2003-
2006 fiscal years), the mandatory dividend payment policy is reinstated accompa-
nied by the implementation of economic reforms, uninterrupted economic growth,
and declining inflation to single digit level.
For 1985-1989 and 1990-1993 fiscal year periods, both Panel A and B show that
profits payout ratio is mostly above the 50% mandatory cash dividend payout ratio
with a noticeable increase in the latter fiscal period. With the change in regulations
in 1995 giving full flexibility in determining the payout policy for corporations trad-
ing in the ISE, we observe a decline in the profits payout ratio from 60% level to
around 40% level. After being granted full autonomy in setting the payout policy,
ISE industrials preferred to retain earnings for internal financing (Adaoglu, 1999).
Especially, in 2002 fiscal year prior to the reinstatement of the mandatory dividend
payout  ratio policy, the profits payout ratio reaches its lowest level of 33% mainly
due to the build-up of losses in 2001 income statements as a result of the econom-
ic crisis and the resulting downside effect on the amount of distributable profit.
Taking out 2001 and 2002 fiscal years from the data set as shown in Panel B does
not change the preceding analysis with a slight increase from 41% to 45%. 
After the reinstatement of mandatory dividend payout policy of 20% in 2003 fis-
cal year, the profits payout level is just above the threshold level mainly due to the
significant losses generated by the adaptation of inflation adjusted financial report-
ing standards. In Panel B, with 2003 or without 2003, we do not find a significant
shift in the profits payout ratio after the regulatory change. In Panel A of Table 1,
the average dividend yield of the ISE is presented showing unsatisfactory levels for
shareholders, especially negative real dividend yields taking into account the high
inflation rates during the analysis period. Most noticeably, the dividend yield
reached its lowest level of 0.94% in 2002 fiscal year just before the reinstatement
of mandatory dividend policy.123
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In Panel A of Table 2, we document the evolution of dividend payout ratio at
both market (aggregate) and corporate level over the 22-year period from 1985 to
2006 fiscal years (1986-2007 distribution years) as well as over the selected periods.
At the corporate level, we calculate mean/median dividend payout ratios including
zero dividend payouts (Corporate Level I in the table) and including only the divi-
dend payers (Corporate Level II in the table).8 In Panel B, using the dividend payouts
at the corporate level among the dividend paying industrials (Corporate Level II), we
statistically test for differences in means/medians between selected periods. In
T Ta ab bl le e   1 1 : : P Pr ro of fi it ts s   P Pa ay yo ou ut t   R Ra at ti io os s   1 19 98 85 5- -2 20 00 06 6   F Fi is sc ca al l   Y Ye ea ar rs s   ( (1 19 98 86 6- -2 20 00 07 7   D Di is st tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n   Y Ye ea ar rs s) )
P Pa an ne el l   A A : : A Av ve er ra ag ge e   D Di iv vi id de en nd d   Y Yi ie el ld d, ,   M Ma an nd da at to or ry y   a an nd d   P Pr ro of fi it ts s   P Pa ay yo ou ut t   R Ra at ti io os s   
*: Data obtained from the ISE official publication Annual Factbook 2007 
http://www.ise.org/quarterlybulletin/data/annualfactxls.zip. 
P Pa an ne el l   B B: : P Pr ro of fi it ts s   P Pa ay yo ou ut t   R Ra at ti io o   f fo or r   S Se el le ec ct te ed d   P Pe er ri io od ds s   a an nd d   S Su ub b- -p pe er ri io od ds s
*: Average of the specified period.
(8) Adaoglu (1999 and 2000) and Yilmaz (2003) include the zero cash dividend payouts in their mean
and median dividend payout ratio calculations creating a downward bias in their means/medians
due to the significant number of corporations omitting dividends (see Table 2 for the percentage
of traded industrials paying dividends).124 Cahit Adao¤lu
order to eliminate the effect of outliers at the corporate level, we exclude corpora-
tions with negative dividend payout ratios as well as corporations with payouts
three standard deviation away from the mean in each fiscal year. A more outlier
resistant measure of central tendency, namely median, is also used in the analysis.
From 1985 to 1993, ISE industrials have the highest mean/median payouts with
the highest percentage number of industrials paying cash dividends mainly due to
the 50% mandatory cash dividend payout ratio. Comparing 1985-1988 to 1989-
1993 periods, the aggregate payouts and the mean/median payouts at the corpo-
rate level increase with a statistically significant increase of 6% in the median. It is
interesting to observe that up to 1993 fiscal year, the aggregate dividend payout
ratio and the mean/median dividend payout ratios at the corporate level do not sig-
nificantly diverge from each other due to the fact that a high percentage of traded
industrials paid cash dividends during that period. A significant divergence and a
decreasing percentage of dividend payers over time are detected after 1993 with
the introduction of flexible payout policy. 
T Ta ab bl le e   2 2: : D Di iv vi id de en nd d   P Pa ay yo ou ut t   R Ra at ti io os s   1 19 98 85 5- -2 20 00 06 6   F Fi is sc ca al l   Y Ye ea ar rs s   ( (1 19 98 86 6- -2 20 00 07 7   D Di is st tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n   Y Yr rs s. .) )   a at t   t th he e   A Ag gg gr re eg ga at te e
( (M Ma ar rk ke et t) )   a an nd d   C Co or rp po or ra at te e   L Le ev ve el l
P Pa an ne el l   A A: : A Ag gg gr re eg ga at te e   a an nd d   C Co or rp po or ra at te e   L Le ev ve el l   P Pa ay yo ou ut t   R Ra at ti io os s      During the flexible dividend policy period of 1994-2002, the aggregate and the
mean/median payouts decrease with a significant decline in the percentage num-
ber of cash dividend payers reaching its lowest level in 2002 fiscal year just before
the reinstatement of mandatory dividend payout starting with 2003 fiscal year.
When we compare 1994-20029 to 1989-1993 period, both the mean and median
of dividend payers decrease with a statistically significant decrease of 14% in the
median (see Panel B). In order to control for the negative effect of the economic cri-
sis in 2001, mean and median are recalculated by removing the payout data of
2001 and 2002  fiscal years resulting in no change in the findings (see Table 1 (Pa-
nel A) – numbers in italics). Interestingly, in 2001 economic crisis year, both the ag-
gregate payout and the median payout at the corporate level are at its highest le-
vel due to the high dividend payout policy of few profitable industrials distributing
cash dividends (i.e., 28% - third lowest percentage of cash dividend payers betwe-
en 1986-2007). 
During the 2003-2006 period, we see further decreases in the mean/median pa-
youts at both corporate and market level with a slight increase in the percentage
number of cash dividend payers. Statistically, we detect a statistically significant dec-
rease of 11% and 7% in mean and median respectively (see Panel B). At the same
time, there is no significant change in the number of traded corporations. In Panel
A, when we remove 2003 fiscal year with record level of aggregate losses (see Fi-
gure 1) due to the implementation of inflation adjusted reporting standards, mean
and median do not differ significantly. In Panel B, we repeat the statistical tests by
removing the outlier years of 2001, 2002 and 2003 in our data set and still detect
a statistically significant 6% decrease in the median of between 1994-2000 and
2004-2006 periods.
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*, **, ***: significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.
(9) As discussed before, the accumulated losses of the economic crisis in 2001 have a downside effect
on the amount of distributable profit in 2002.5.2. Dividend Types and Profit/Loss Responses
In Table 3, we focus on four types of payout policy tools which are cash divi-
dends only, stock dividends only, both cash and stock dividends, and finally, divi-
dend omissions. We try to see the trend in the choice of the payout tools and to
find out the effect of stock dividends as a new payout tool starting in 1994 fiscal
year. Stock dividends can be substitutes to cash dividends increasing the flexibility
of managers in setting the dividend policy (Baker et al., 1995).  
Using the same selected periods as in Table 2, the selected parameter for the
choice of the payout tool is the average and the median percentage number of tra-
ded industrials using one of the four tools as depicted in Table 3 during the specifi-
ed periods. In Table 3, we clearly observe that there is a significant decrease in the
percentage number of cash dividend payers over time from 84% average (84% me-
dian) level during 1985-1988 to 31% average (34% median) level during 2003-2006
period. Similarly, there is a significant increase in the percentage number of dividend
omissions from 16% average (16% median) to 63% average (60% median) level.
Clearly, the abolishment of the mandatory cash dividend payout ratio in 1994 fiscal
year resulted in a significant decrease in the number of cash dividend payers and
the reinstatement of the mandatory cash dividend payout in 2003 fiscal year has not
been effective and has not resulted in an increase in the number of cash dividend
payers, but has resulted in a lower percentage number of dividend payers (i.e., 44%
average between 1994-2002 vs. 31% average between 2003-2006).
Stock dividends have not turned out to be a significant substitute payout tool
with an average level of 7% for stock dividends only and 5% level for the combina-
tion of cash and stock dividends during the 1994-2002 period. The use of stock di-
vidends has decreased even more during the 2003-2006 period. In other words, the
dividend policy flexibility granted for the ISE industrials in 1994 fiscal year did not
result in the substitution of cash dividends by stock dividends but rather resulted in
an increase in the number of dividend omissions.
In Table 4, we extend the analysis by investigating the choice of payout tool in
response to whether the corporation has profit or loss declared in its income state-
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*: Removing the outlier fiscal years of 2001, 2002 and 2003 does not result in significant changes quantitatively
and qualitatively.ment. Panel A and B show the choice of payout tool for the selected periods in ca-
ses of profits and losses. The results in Panel A and B support the preceding findings
and in Panel A, we detect a decrease in the percentage number of cash dividends
over time even though corporations declare profits. Similarly, the reinstatement of
the mandatory dividend policy in 2003 fiscal year has not been effective in increa-
sing the number of cash dividend payers for profit declaring corporations. In Panel
B, the evidence is striking with the payout policy tool choice of dividend omission in
case of losses. Clearly, for all selected periods, whenever an industrial declares a
loss, the payout policy is to omit the dividend payment. In line with the findings of
Adaoglu (2000), this dividend behavior has not changed and it is a clear indicator
for the industrials that they do not use dividend smoothing policies. For both profits
and losses, stock dividends do not emerge as a cash dividend substitution tool with
very few industrials using stock dividends.
5.3. Empirical Observations for 2002 and 2006 Fiscal Years (2003 
and 2007 Distribution Years)
In this section, we explore the dividend and earnings concentration, and we test
whether there is a relationship between the size (market capitalization) of the ISE
industrial and the dividend payout ratio. For instance, DeAngelo et al. (2004) and
Ferris et al. (2006a and 2006b) detect a high level of dividends and earnings con-
centration for U.S., U.K. and Japan, and they also find that the level of concentra-
tion gets higher over time for U.S. and U.K., but not for Japan. Da Silva et al. (2004)
find a positive monotonic relationship between the corporation size and the divi-
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*: Removing the outlier fiscal years of 2001, 2002 and 2003 does not result in significant changes quantitatively
and qualitatively.dend payout ratio for the U.K. corporations, but not for the German corporations.
Reddy and Rath (2005) also find a positive relationship and state that the dividend
paying corporations are larger and more profitable in India. Similarly, Fama and
French (2001) find that the three characteristics of dividend payers are the profita-
bility, investment opportunities and the size for the U.S. industrials. Larger and pro-
fitable corporations are more likely to pay dividends in the U.S.. Using an internatio-
nal data set from 30 countries, Ferris et al. (2008) find that larger firms have a hig-
her propensity to pay cash dividends.
Similar to the methodology adopted in DeAngelo et al. (2004) and Ferris et al.
(2006b), we focus on a particular period by selecting a beginning fiscal year, 2002,
and an ending fiscal year, 2006. There are a couple of motivations in selecting the-
se two particular fiscal years. Firstly, as it can be observed in Figure 1, 2002 fiscal
year is a turn around year in terms of the amount of aggregate cash dividends and
aggregate profits of the ISE industrials. Between 1985 and 2002 fiscal years, there
has not been a significant change in the level of aggregate cash dividends even tho-
ugh the number of traded industrials increased significantly. Moreover, in 2002 fis-
cal year, the industrials do not have an unusual amount of aggregate losses, but it
is the fiscal year in which the percentage number of cash dividend paying industri-
als (26% - see Table 2) is at its lowest level over the 22 years analysis period (1985-
2006). Secondly, it is the last fiscal year in which the ISE industrials are not subject
to mandatory cash dividend payout and this will enable us to evaluate the impact
of the reinstatement of mandatory cash dividend payout starting in fiscal year 2003.
To the best of our knowledge, no study exists investigating the dividend behavior
of ISE industrials after the reinstatement of the mandatory dividend policy in 2003
fiscal year. Thirdly, after 2002 fiscal year period, ISE industrials have adopted the inf-
lation adjusted financial reporting as well as the international accounting standards
between 2003 and 2006 fiscal years. Fourthly, the number of traded industrials is
relatively stable compared to the pre 2003 high growth period.
5.3.1. Dividend and earnings concentration
In Table 5, we rank the cash dividend paying industrials in groups of five based
on the amount of dividends paid in 2002 (61 dividend paying industrials) and 2006
(83 dividend paying industrials) fiscal years, and calculate the percentage of each
group’s amount of distributed dividends relative to the fiscal year’s total. We also
calculate the cumulative percentage and the real amount of dividends for each gro-
up. Similar to the level of dividend concentration level for the Japanese industrials
but lower than for U.S. and U.K. industrials, we detect a high level of dividend con-
centration of around 45% for the Top 5 and around 60% for the Top 10. The Top
5 almost accounts for the half of the total dividends distributed in each fiscal year.
However, unlike the increasing level of concentration for U.S. and U.K. industrials
128 Cahit Adao¤luover time, we detect a small increase in the level of dividend concentration betwe-
en 2002 and 2006, only around 5% increase for the Top 5 and 2% increase for the
Top 10. Additionally, unlike the evidence for U.S. and U.K. in which the bottom gro-
ups pay less real dividends over time, for every group of five ISE industrials, we de-
tect a significant increase in the amount of real dividends with the Top 5 paying twi-
ce of the total amount for 2002 fiscal year as a whole. 
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y ye ea ar rs sTaking into account the findings of Lintner (1956) for the U.S. corporations and
Adaoglu (2000) for the ISE corporations that the earnings of the corporation is the
main determinant of dividend supply, the high level of dividend concentration
detected in Table 5 can be driven by the high level of earnings concentration among
the dividend paying corporations. In Table 6, we analyze the level of earnings con-
centration for each group of five industrials in the dividend ranking of Table 5. In
Table 6, similar to the findings of dividend concentration, we detect a high level of
earnings concentration among the Top 5 and 10 dividend payers accounting for
around 40% and 50% of total earnings in each fiscal year. Additionally, we detect
a slight increase in the level of earnings concentration between the two fiscal years
(i.e., 37.82% vs. 39.57% for Top 5). However, the earnings concentration evidence
in the U.S. and U.K. is stronger showing a significant increase over time with low
ranking dividend payers having decreases in the total amount of real earnings. In
the ISE setting, all dividend ranking groups experience significant increases in real
earnings between 2002 and 2006 fiscal years with all industrials earning 1,351.30
million YTL in 2002 and 5,689.03 million YTL in 2006 corresponding to around
400% increase in real amounts. The evidence supports the empirical findings of
Lintner and Adaoglu that earnings is the main determinant in the dividend supply
with the fact that earning increases are accompanied with higher dividends, and
similarly, any changes in the earnings concentration is directly reflected in the divi-
dend concentration taking into account that there is no change in the typical pay-
out ratio among the dividend paying industrials (i.e., no change in the mean 53%
and the median 48% at the corporate level, see Table 2).10
5.3.2 Size effect
Theoretically, industrials with a high market capitalization are expected to have
stable earnings, proven track of profitability and easier access to capital markets re-
lative to smaller and riskier industrials (Da Silva et al., 2004). Consequently, large in-
dustrials are expected to have a higher dividend payout ratio mainly due to the ex-
pectation that they have more free cash flows relative to small industrials. We test
the size effect by partitioning the populations for 2002 and 2006 fiscal years into fi-
ve quintiles based on the average market capitalization in each respective fiscal ye-
ar. Then, we test for the difference in mean/median between each quintile’s divi-
dend payout ratio and the population (All). We also test for the difference in me-
an/median between the first (highest market capitalization) and the fifth (lowest
market capitalization) quintiles. We investigate the percentage of cash dividend pa-
ying corporations in each quintile and the correlation between the corporation size
and the payout ratio. For the correlation test, we use the natural log of the avera-
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(10) For instance, the small increase in the earnings concentration of Top 5 (37.82% vs. 39.57% for
Top 5) is accompanied by a small increase in the dividend concentration of Top 5 (45.10%
vs.49.50% for Top 5).ge market capitalization in order to normalize the data since the Pearson correlati-
on test is sensitive to outliers. We use the coefficient of variation as a tool for me-
asuring the relative dispersion in each quintile. Finally, we use the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis H-test and the parametric one-way ANOVA F-test to test for the dif-
ference in mean/median among all quintiles.
In Table 7, Panel A and Panel B present the results for the size effect in 2002 and
2006 fiscal years, and we detect statistically significant size effects in both years. Es-
pecially, in year 2006, the effect is more prevalent with a monotonic decrease in the
mean dividend payout ratio and the percentage number of corporations paying di-
vidends, and a monotonic increase in the coefficient of variations. For both years,
by analyzing the Mann-Whitney test and t-test results, we find statistically significant
differences in mean/median between each quintile and the population (All) except
for Size 3 which represents the average. Kruskal-Wallis H-test and one way ANOVA
F-test are all significant detecting differences among the quintiles. Although not re-
ported in Table 711, the differences between the first and fifth quintile’s mean/me-
dian are statistically significant for both fiscal years. The statistically significant Pear-
son correlation between the natural log of the average market capitalization and
the dividend payout ratio is 0.325 (p:0.00) and 0.437 (p:0.00) in 2002 and 2006 res-
pectively. It is also interesting to find out that the industrials in the fifth quintile (Si-
ze 5) have a median payout of 0% with an extremely low percentage of these in-
dustrials paying dividends (2% in 2002 and 5% in 2006). 
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(11) Size 1 vs. Size 5: 2002 fiscal year, Mann-Whitney test: 2,093.0* (p:0.00) and t-test: 4.98 (p:0.00)
Size 1 vs. Size 5: 2006 fiscal year, Mann-Whitney test: 2,598.0* (p:0.00) and t-test: 7.32 (p:0.00)
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*, **, ***: significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.6. Conclusions and Further Research Implications
This study contributes to the growing international evidence regarding the re-
cent empirical dividend policy observations which are mainly the declining number
of dividend payers accompanied by an increasing level of dividends and earnings
concentration over time. There are conflicting empirical evidence whether the divi-
dends are disappearing or reappearing (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al.,
2004; Julio and Ikenberry, 2004). Moreover, there are variations in the level of divi-
dend/earnings concentration and national differences still exist in the globalized ca-
pital markets (Ferris et al., 2006b). For the Istanbul Stock Exchange industrials, we
detect similar findings along with its own national characteristics. We detect a sig-
nificant decline in the number of cash dividend payers between 1985-2006 fiscal ye-
ars (1987-2007 distribution years), but especially during the 1994-2006 fiscal years.
However, similar to the findings of DeAngelo et al. (2004) for the U.S. market, the
nominal and real level of dividends and earnings have increased for the ISE industri-
als during the 2003-2006 fiscal years (2004-2007 distribution years).
The increase in the level of dividends is mainly driven by the high level of divi-
dend concentration and earnings concentration. Taking into account the finding
that cash dividend payers make up a high percentage of industrial earnings and the-
re is a high level of dividend/earnings concentration, the growth trend in the level
of earnings between 2003 and 2006 fiscal years has resulted in a significant increa-
se in the amount of dividends. In other words, during the growth period, highly con-
centrated dividend payers which earned more income distributed more dividends.
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*, **, ***: significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.However, unlike the evidence in the U.S. and U.K., we do not detect a significant
change in the level of dividend and earnings concentration over time and we do find
increases in the level of dividends and earnings among all ranks of dividend payers. 
The size effect is detected for the ISE industrials with a monotonic increase in the
average payout ratio and the percentage number of industrials paying dividends as
the market capitalizations of the industrials get bigger. Interestingly, the median di-
vidend payout ratio for the third, fourth and fifth quintile (i.e., smaller market capi-
talization) is 0% accompanied by a significant decrease in the percentage number
of payers. The industrials having small market capitalization either do not have fre-
e cash flows (profits) or retain all their earnings for internally financing their invest-
ments. This is an empirical research question that has to be investigated by using
multivariate statistical tests.
The reinstatement of mandatory dividend policy regulation in 2003 has not be-
en successful in terms of forcing the industrials to pay more dividends. We do not
detect any significant change in the profits payout ratio and moreover, we detect
further decreases in the dividend payout ratio at both market and corporate level,
and unsatisfactory increase in the percentage number of dividend payers only catc-
hing up with the level in 1999. Topaç (2004) tries to find answers for the ineffecti-
veness of the mandatory dividend policy regulation and puts forward that the re-
cent changes in the accounting standards have resulted in substantial amount of los-
ses being recorded in the financial statements and these losses adversely affect the
level of distributable profit due to the fact that industrials are not allowed to distri-
bute dividends before covering the previous years’ losses from their net income and
retained earnings. Topaç also recommends that corporations should only be allo-
wed to issue rights offerings at the nominal price under very special circumstances
and the stringent restrictions on rights offerings will stop the corporate malpractice
of collecting back the distributed dividends through highly discounted rights offe-
rings.
Finally, the introduction of stock dividends as a payout tool has not proven itself
as a substitute payout policy for cash dividends and dividend omissions have proved
itself as the only payout policy in case of losses supporting the notion of instable di-
vidend policy for the ISE industrials. Following the growing literature in corporate
governance, another research topic in our agenda is the effect of ownership struc-
ture on the observed dividend policy behavior of industrials. Additionally, the divi-
dend policy of the financial corporations needs to be investigated for the Turkish
market.
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